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Executive Summary
e last political elections in March 2018 highlighted the issues connected to mi-
gration and the #ows of political refugees, making them central issues in the polit-
ical agenda and in the public opinion. e electoral consensus with League North 
(Lega Nord) and its leader Matteo Salvini has increased across 2018 following an 
anti-migration rhetoric. Within this discursive frame, the issues of Islam and Mus-
lim communities have drawn particular attention through the stereotype of their 
incompatibility with Christian and Western cultures, and claims that Islam is a re-
ligion based on terrorism. e xenophobic and anti-Islam climate fostered by the 
traditional political players from the right wing, Lega Nord and Fratelli d’Italia, by 
the extreme-right movements (Casa Pound and Forza Nuova), and by the most con-
servative branches of the mass media, such as Il Giornale, has caused very negative 
e$ects on a social level, legitimising racist behaviours. Physical and verbal attacks 
on immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and Muslim citizens have increased in the 
north and south of Italy, leading to dramatic events such as the wounding by gun-
shot of six migrants from Nigeria in Macerata on 3 February and the murder of a 
Senegalese street seller, Idy Diene (54), in Florence on 5 March. Moreover, as out-
lined by research (see Vox Diritti), the hate speech towards Muslim communities 
has increased, re#ecting the birth of a widespread hostility in Italian society towards 
cultural diversity. e response of civil society, the democratic associations, and an 
important part of the Catholic world has de!nitely been consistent, but it appears 
to be ine$ective in terms of opposing this drift. e collaboration between these 
realities and Muslim NGO is becoming more and more urgent in order to contain 
the situation that is jeopardising the democratic structures and the future of civil 
coexistence in Italy.
477islamophobiaeurope.com  •        @islamophobiaEIR
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ITALY
Sintesi
Le ultime elezioni politiche del marzo del 2018 hanno evidenziato un’enfasi sui 
temi legati all’immigrazione e ai #ussi di rifugiati politici quale problema centrale 
nell’agenda politica e nell’opinione pubblica. Il consenso elettorale verso la Lega 
Nord e il suo leader Matteo Salvini si è accresciuto lungo tutto il 2018 sulla spinta 
di una retorica anti-immigrazione. All’interno di questo fame discorsivo la que-
stione dell’Islam e delle comunità musulmane ha avuto una particolare attenzione 
attraverso il solito stereotipato armamentario collegato all’incompatibilità con la 
nostra cultura cristiana e occidentale, e con i richiami ad una religione del terrore. 
Il clima xenofobo e anti-Islam alimentato dai tradizionali attori politici della destra, 
Lega Nord e Fratelli d’Italia, dei movimenti di estrema destra (Casa Pound a Forza 
Nuova) e dai settori più conservatori dei mass-media, come ad esempio Il Giorna-
le, ha avuto e$etti molto negativi a livello sociale legittimando comportamenti di 
stampo razzista. Si sono accresciuti sia al Nord che al Sud gli attacchi !sici e verbali 
nei confronti dei migranti, richiedenti asilo, rifugiati e cittadini musulmani !no ad 
arrivare ad eventi drammatici quali il ferimento di sei migranti nigeriani a Macerata 
il 3 febbraio e l’omicidio di un venditore ambulante senegalese a Firenze, Idy Diene 
di 54 anni, il 5 marzo. 
Inoltre, come rilevato dalle ricerche (vedi VoxDiritti) è aumentato nel corso 
del 2018 il discorso d’odio nei confronti delle comunità islamiche, specchio di una 
di$usa penetrazione nella società italiana di ostilità verso le diversità culturali. La 
risposta della società civile, delle associazioni democratiche e di una parte importante 
del mondo cattolico è stata sicuramente ampia, ma appare ine/cace a contrastare 
questa deriva. Sempre più urgente diventa la collaborazione tra queste realtà e le 
NGOs musulmane al !ne di arginare questa situazione che mette in crisi gli stessi 
assetti democratici e il futuro della convivenza civile in Italia.
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Type of Regime: Democratic Republic
Form of Government: Parliamentary government
Ruling Parties: Five Stars and League North
Opposition Parties: Democratic Party, Free and Equal +Europe (centre-left parties), 
and Forza Italia
Last Elections: 2018 Legislative Election: Chamber of Deputies: Five Stars, 133 
seats; Centre-Right, 151 seats (League North: 17,3% equal, to 73 seats); Centre-Left, 
88 seats; Left, 14 seats; Far Right, 0 seats; Senate of Republic: Five Stars, 68 seats; 
Centre-Right, 77 seats (League North: 17,6% equal to 37 seats); Centre-Left, 43 
seats; Left, 4 seats; Far-Right, 0 seats.
Total Population: 60.483.973 million (National Institute of Statistic, January 2018)
Major Languages: Italian
O!cial Religion: No o/cial religion (Secularism)
Statistics on Islamophobia: N/A.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: Regarding 2018, there is no o/cial data 
on racism and discrimination; the public agencies such as UNAR (National O/ce 
Racial Antidiscrimination) have not published speci!c statistics or reports in the last 
year. e last o/cial report is from the OCSE based on a report by the Ministry of 
Interior in 2016 that documented 33 racist incidents.
Major Religions (% of Population): 74,4% Catholic Church, 22,6% Irreligious, 
3,0% Other (of which 15% are Muslims)
Muslim Population (% of Population): 2.800.000 (4,8%) (PEW Research, 2017).
Main Muslim Community Organisations: UCOI (Unione delle comunità islamiche 
italiane), CoReIs (Comunità religiosa islamica italiana), Giovani Musulmani d’Italia
Main NGOs Combatting Islamophobia: In Italy, there are speci!c NGOs or public 
agencies dealing directly with Islamophobic issues. Islamophobia arises in the wider 
issue of defending the citizenship or human rights of migrants and of anti-discrimi-
nation complaints. Some important Catholic and laic associations at a national level 
such as ACLI (Associazioni Cristiane dei Lavoratori Italiani), ARCI (Associazione 
Ricreativa Culturale Italiana), and ANPI (Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d’Italia), 
are historically at the forefront of the !ght against all forms of discrimination and 
racism in Italian society. Some NGOs like Lunaria every year promote analysis and 
reports on racist and Islamophobic attacks in society. e Italian context is charac-
terised by a signi!cant variety of local civil society players who act against situations 
of exclusion and discrimination of migrants and Muslim communities. In this sense, 
the role of Muslim NGOs is important such as UCOII (Unione delle comunità 
islamiche italiane), CoReIs (Comunità religiosa islamica italiana), and Giovani Mu-
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sulmani d’Italia, but there is not a single “voice” against Islamophobia that is repre-
sentative of all Muslim associations and communities. 
Far Right Parties: Forza Nuova, Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore
Far Right Movements: Casa Pound, Lealtà e Azione, Militia
Far Right Terrorist Organisations: N/A 
Limitations to Islamic Practices
− Hijab Ban: No (depends on local decision)
− Halal Slaughter Ban: No
− Minaret Ban: No (depends on local decision)
− Circumcision Ban: No
− Burka Ban: No (depends on local decision)
− Prayer Ban: No (depends on local decision) 
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Introduction
e latest report on Islamophobia in Italy (2017) reported a signi!cant concern 
about the increase of xenophobic and racist contents regarding migrants, asylum 
seekers, and Muslims in the public opinion and political discourse. During the elec-
tion campaign, this concern became a tangible reality through a massive “bombard-
ment” of hate speech, promoted by League North and its leader Matteo Salvini 
and supported by other far right parties like Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy). e 
negative representations of Islam and Muslim communities, as well as immigrants 
in general, have been the central features of a political struggle characterised by the 
nationalistic slogan “Italians First!”
After the results of the elections and the birth of a new government formed by 
the coalition of the League North and Five Stars, Matteo Salvini was appointed Min-
ister of Interior, becoming responsible for the migration policy and the relations with 
religious minorities. erefore, the xenophobic dynamic is still present and active. 
e consensus in favour of the extremist positions of League North is well proven 
by the increase of its votes in the last political elections, with a switch from 17% to 
more than 30% of potential votes registered by all opinion polls.
Italy does not have an o/cial record of the events or attacks on Italian Mus-
lim communities. ere are some NGOs and speci!c anti-racist associations that 
collect data from di$erent sources, mainly from the mass media. According to their 
analyses, it is clear that there has been an increase of Islamophobic content and hate 
speech in social media, politics, and mass media. A signi!cant example, for instance, 
is the increase of hate tweets against Muslims from 22.435 in 2016 to 64.934 in the 
period 2017/2018. A di$erent report on the social and political situation shows that 
Italy is increasingly becoming intolerant towards immigrants and Muslims1 .
A survey carried out by the Social Change Initiative in partnership with More 
in Common on the attitudes of Italians towards immigration has highlighted the 
concern that people with Islamic backgrounds will not integrate in Italian society: 
40% of Italians claim that Italian identity and Islam are incompatible.
Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents  
and Discursive Events 
Physical and Verbal Attacks
During 2018, there was an important increase of physical and verbal attacks against 
immigrants, Muslims, and asylum seekers committed mainly by militants belonging 
to organised extreme-right movements, but also, in speci!c cases, by “normal” citi-
zens, justi!ed for their use of violence by the widespread xenophobic climate that has 
1. “Immigrazione in Italia tra realtà e percezione”, Istituto Cattaneo,  https://www.cattaneo.org/2018/08/27/immi-
grazione-in-italia-tra-realta-e-percezione/, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
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become hegemonic in the public discourse. ere is no o/cial data from institutions 
or public agencies, but various NGOs or anti-fascist movements have promoted the 
collection of data about physical and verbal attacks. Some examples are Cronache di 
ordinario razzismo (Chronicles of Ordinary Racism) and the site http://www.ecn.org//
antifa. e lack of o/cial data on hate crimes and religious racism in Italy represents 
an important de!cit for the enhancement of speci!c anti-discrimination policies and 
for the interventions to !ght “societal racism”. Another important point of discus-
sion regards researchers’ di/culty in di$erentiating migrant/asylum seeker/refugee 
victims of hate crimes from their religious memberships, and thus their di/culty 
in de!ning the various types of harassment. However, in the case of asylum seekers 
or refugees we know from o/cial data that, in most cases, they come from Muslim 
countries (Tunisia, Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Algeria).2 e most tragic events 
have been the wounding by gunshot of six migrants from Nigeria in Macerata on 
3 February, and the murder of a Senegalese street seller, Idy Diene (54), in Flor-
ence on 5 March.3 In the !rst case, the assailant was a young Italian citizen, Luca 
Traini, ex-candidate in the administrative election with the League North and close 
to neo-fascist groups. His justi!cation, reported after the racist attack, was related to 
the murder of a girl by a Nigerian immigrant. In the second case, the murderer was 
an Italian man, Roberto Pirrone, retired and 65 years old, who declared he had gone 
out to commit suicide but after changing his mind, he shot the young African man. 
e victim was a leading !gure of the Senegalese community in Florence and in the 
local mosque, as reported by friends and local associations.4
In a small city of Giulia in Friuli-Venezia, a severed pig’s head was placed on the 
fence of a property hosting eight asylum seekers, at the end of the month of Rama-
dan. At the end of August, the keeper of a mosque in Salerno was heavily o$ended 
and beaten. In his statements after the brutal attack, he said that “they addressed me 
with ‘Fucking Muslim’”.5 In Padua, on a night of mid-March, an unknown person 
set !re to the front doorway of the local mosque. e police o/cers found evidence 
2. See the official data from the Ministry of Interior: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/cruscotto_gior-
naliero_11-01-2019.pdf, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
3. Agnese Ananasso, “Raid Razzista A Macerata, Spari Contro Gli Africani: 6 Feriti. Fermato İtaliano İncensu-
rato”, La Repubblica, 3 February 2018, https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/02/03/news/macerata_sparato-
ria-187934230/, (Access date: 2 September 2019); di Simone Innocenti, Matteo Leoni, Jacopo Storni, “Firenze, 
Spari Su Ponte Vespucci  Ucciso Un Ambulante L’ira Dei Senegalesi, Danni İn Centro”, Corriere Fiorentino,  5 
March 2018, https://corrierefiorentino.corriere.it/firenze/notizie/cronaca/18_marzo_05/firenze-spari-ponte-ves-
pucci-ferito-uomo-colore-67e87d22-2065-11e8-b9db-31561b61aa5f.shtml?refresh_ce-cp, (Access date: 2 Septem-
ber 2019).
4. Annalisa Camilli, “Un Paese İn Cui İ Neri Vengono Uccisi Per Strada”, Internazionale, 7 March 2018, https://
www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2018/03/07/firenze-senegalese-ucciso, (Access date: 2 September 
2019).
5. Redazione L’Occhio di Salerno, “Razzismo A Salerno, Aggredito Ragazzo Convertito All’ıslam. È İl Curatore 
Della Moschea”, L’Occhio di Salerno, 28 August 2018, https://salerno.occhionotizie.it/razzismo-salerno-aggredi-
to-ragazzo-convertito-islam/, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
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of arson.6 In other cases, police forces played a part. e most serious case was the 
assault by three police o/cers (Carabinieri) on 28 June on a migrant day-labourer, 
with regular status, found in his house with guns and a copy of the Quran. He was 
subsequently arrested and taken into custody for no concrete reason. A few days lat-
er, the three Carabinieri were arrested for “fabricating” evidence against the migrant 
worker and unfairly accusing him of being an “Islamist terrorist”.7
Employment
In line with the lack of data on racist events, there is no speci!c, empirical evidence 
of Islamophobia regarding the complex and varying world of employment. All the 
Italian trade unions have a migration o/ce which manages the main issues of migra-
tion and defends the rights of migrant workers, but they don’t have a detailed analy-
sis of discriminations based on religion. Moreover, a recent and detailed research on 
anti-discrimination by the main Italian trade union (CGIL) shows that anti-discrim-
ination initiatives are sometimes ine/cient because of their fragmentation, heteroge-
neity, and the inadequate knowledge of anti-discrimination laws.8 
e survey “Work Force in Europe 2018” has highlighted that Italy has the 
highest rate of workers who feel discriminated against (42%), while 4% of the Italian 
sample (1.300 interviewees) declared being discriminated because of their religion 
(mainly of Islam).9
Two events have had a wide appeal on the general public. In mid-January, a 
judge of the Bologna Court denied a young lawyer her right to assist the judicial 
hearing because she was wearing the “Islamic veil”. According to press, the young 
lawyer refused to take it o$ and left the courtroom declaring that the judge would 
have to explain his behaviour by the fact “that this is the respect for our culture and 
our traditions”.10 In June, one of the main Italian trade unions reported that in one 
of the most important low-cost supermarkets (Eurospin) a migrant worker of the 
Islamic faith was transferred to another workplace because of his previous request to 
suspend the night shift during Ramadan.11
6. “Incendiata Nella Notte La Porta Della Moschea Di Padova”, Ait Veneto, 8 March 2018, http://www.ansa.it/
veneto/notizie/2018/03/05/incendiata-nella-notte-la-porta-della-moschea-di-padova_a1deb842-a469-4ef8-bc44-
a7d5b204dce6.html, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
7. “Arrestati Tre Carabinieri, False Accuse A İmmigrato”, Ait Cronaca, 27 June 2018, http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/
cronaca/2018/06/27/arrestati-tre-carabinieri-false-accuse-a-immigrato_c581d86a-f987-4afa-a65f-5bcaaeb85992.
html, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
8. Puppa F., “Sindacato, Lavoratori Immigrati E Discriminazioni Razziali Nell’italia Della Crisi”, Mondi Migranti, 
September 2018.
9. “Discriminazioni Sul Posto Di Lavoro”, Avvenire, 9 March 2018,  https://www.avvenire.it/economia/pagine/
adp-discriminazioni-sul-posto-di-lavoro, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
10. Guiseppe Baldessarro, “L’avvocata İn Aula Con İl Velo: ‘Cacciata Dal Giudice, Ma Ho Vinto İo”, Rep, 17 
January 2018,  https://rep.repubblica.it/pwa/generale/2018/01/17/news/l_avvocata_in_aula_con_il_velo_caccia-
ta_dal_giudice_ho_vinto_io_-186711737/, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
11. “Chiede Di Non Lavorare Di Notte Durante İl Ramadan E L’azienda Per Punizione Lo Trasferisce”, Torino.
repubblica, 4 June 2018, https://torino.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/06/04/news/chiede_di_non_lavorare_di_
notte_durante_il_ramadan_e_l_azienda_per_punizione_lo_trasferisce-198170994/, (Access date: 3 September 
2019).
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Education
Generally, the Italian education system is strongly intercultural and open to the 
integration of children with di$erent cultural backgrounds. In the last years, in-
cluding 2018, there have been many examples of positive dynamics, but also some 
negative events of ethnic segregation in some schools of the metropolitan inner 
areas because of the e$ects of “white #ight”.12 A recent qualitative research carried 
out by the Catholic University of Milan entitled “e Religious Dimension in 
Multicultural Schools. Identity and Membership, Behaviours and Symbols, Con-
#icts and Values” highlighted how religious memberships are “ignored” in every-
day relationships among students. erefore, it is clear that the issue of religion 
in schools does not appear to play a role in school life. Moreover, the plurality of 
religious memberships does not seem to be a source of open con#ict in classrooms, 
even if the largest part of critical situations recorded are connected to students with 
Islamic backgrounds.13 
e multicultural school and history textbooks have been the object of a strong 
debate. For example, in October 2018, the newspaper LaVerità published two arti-
cles against the educational book for secondary schools because of the “false posi-
tive representation of Islamic civilization”. e !rst article was a front-page editorial 
by director Maurizio Belpietro entitled “Brainwashing at Secondary Schools. e 
School Books Promote Islam”. e second was a long “critical” article by Francesco 
Borgonovo entitled “Brainwashed in the Classroom. In Our Children’s Book, Only 
the Christians Do Holy War”, which aimed to illustrate all the “supposed” mistakes 
of the author and to emphasise the implicit violence of Islam throughout history.
Politics
e political dynamic in 2018, mostly because of the national and local electoral 
campaigns, focused disruptively on openly racist and xenophobic tones. e often 
reiterated political statements of League North by its leader Matteo Salvini are based 
on the typical aversive claims of “invasion”, “Italians First”, or “Close the borders”. 
We are witnessing a process of the dehumanisation of the foreigner identi!ed in var-
ious ways, particularly in the case of asylum seekers and Muslims. is hegemonic 
representation is connected to a continuous devaluation of democratic civil society, 
NGOs and part of the Catholic Church, including the !gure of the Pope, involved 
in the integration and in interfaith dialogue. 
12. Matteo Piolatto, “La Segregazione Nella Scuola Secondaria İtaliana”, Weltforum.it, 6 June 2018, https://
welforum.it/il-punto/separati-a-scuola/la-segregazione-nella-scuola-secondaria-italiana/, (Access date: 3 Sep-
tember 2019).
13. Maddalena Colombo, Rosangela Lodigiani, Mariagrazia Santagati and Antonio Cuciniello, “La Dimensione 
Religiosa Nelle Scuole Multiculturali. Identità E Appartenenze, Comportamenti E Simboli, Conflitti E Valori”, 
Università Cattolica Del Sacro Cuore, 12 January 2018, https://progetti.unicatt.it/progetti-milan-eventi-la-dimensi-
one-religiosa-nelle-scuole-multiculturali-identita-e-appartenenze-comportamenti, (Access date: 3 September 2019).
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e report “Barometer of Hate” published by Amnesty International has mon-
itored the hate speech present in the social pro!les (Facebook and Twitter) of the 
candidates in the last electoral campaign in Italy.14 Most of the hate speech analysed 
came from League North (51% of statements) and Brothers of Italy (27%). e 
migration has been the key issue of the collected data (91%), followed by the Islam-
ophobic attitudes (11%). e main topics concern the typical stereotypes attributed 
to Islam and the !gure of the Muslim: invasion, too many mosques in the national 
context, the subordination/inferiorisation of women and, most importantly, “the 
perception of Islam not as a religion but as an imposition of its ‘own’ law and justice” 
(Amnesty International, 2018). 
Some paradigmatic examples are the following statements by Matteo Salvini 
expressed in his electoral campaign:
Once we have the government, we will regulate every Islamic presence in the 
country. Exactly as in di/cult times Oriana Fallaci claimed, we are under attack. 
Our culture, society, customs, lifestyle are at risk (…) e skin colour is not so 
important, there is a real danger: centuries of history that risk disappearing if the 
Islamisation prevails. 
(ANSA, 1/15/2018)15
e cultural issue is if Islam, nowadays, can be compatible with our values, 
with our freedom and with our Constitution I have strong doubts (…) e fact 
that Islam represents a risk is obvious if the Islamic declaration of human rights 
stipulates that Islamic justice prevails over national justice. is is a problem for 
me, I’d rather not be like in Great Britain, with the Islamic courts instead of the 
English courts. 
(quotidiano.net 2/8/2018,)16
 e anti-migration and Islamophobic climates continued after the end of the 
national elections, and they represent the most important topic in the political strat-
egy of League North. In the o/cial “Agreement of Government” signed by League 
North and Five Stars, the issue of immigration is signi!cant in terms of a much 
stronger control and repression of the migration #ows. Speci!cally, “the control 
and the immediate closure of all radical Islamic associations, as well as of irregular 
mosques and places of worship” was highlighted.17 Other signi!cant political play-
14. The posts, tweets, videos of 1.419 candidates were monitored daily during the last three weeks of the electoral 
campaign; for all methodological information and the complete report see: “Un Osservatorio Sui Discorsi D’odio 
In Campagna Elettorale”, Amnesty.it, https://www.amnesty.it/barometro-odio/, (Access date: 3 September 2019).
15. “Il ritorno della razza”, Cronache di ordinario razzismo, 14 June 2018, (http://www.cronachediordinariorazzis-
mo.org/il-ritorno-della-razza-lunaria), (Access date: 3 September 2019).
16. “Elezioni 2018, Salvini Va All’attacco: ‘Islam İncompatibile Con La Costituzione”, Quotidiano.net, 8 Feb-
ruary 2018, https://www.quotidiano.net/politica/elezioni-2018-programma-lega-nord-1.3711353, (Access date: 3 
September 2019).
17. Pasini N. and Regalia M. “L’immigrazione Al Centro: Le Elezioni Del 2018 In Italia”, in Fondazione Ismu, 
XXIV Rapporto sulle immigrazioni, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2018.
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ers have been very active. e militants of extreme right parties, Forza Nuova and 
Fratelli d’Italia, organised di$erent manifestations against the opening of Islamic 
centres or mosques, and the presence of Muslim communities. For example, on 6 
October, in the city of Bologna, Forza Nuova organised a demonstration against the 
construction of a mosque and displayed banners against Archbishop Matteo Zuppi 
calling him a “heretic” because he was in favour of a dialogue with the local Muslim 
community. (Fig. 1) In January, before the electoral campaign, activists of Fratelli 
d’Italia, in a small city close to Florence, a/xed big posters in the area where the 
local mosque would be built with the claims “No Mosque” and “Italians First”.18 
In June, counsellors of the Municipality of Naples exhibited a big banner with the 
writing “Islam’s Square” (instead of “Garibaldi Square”) fuelling an argument with 
the Mayor of Naples Luigi De Magistris, who is considered “guilty of permitting the 
historical centre of the city to completely change because of the uncontrolled arrivals 
of asylum seekers and illegal migrants”.19
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Figure 1: Protest against the mosque in Bologna by Forza Nuova (6 October 2018),20
18. Cronache Di Ordinario Razzismo, www.cronachediordinariorazzismo.org, (Access date: 3 September 2019). 
19. Redazione na, “Napoli, striscione vergognoso di FdI: ‘Piazza dell’Islam”, FarodiRoma, 18 July 2018,  http://
www.farodiroma.it/napoli-striscione-vergognoso-di-fdi-piazza-dellislam, (Access date: 3 September 2019).
20. Antonella Scarcella - Noemi Di Leonardo, “Forza Nuova: ‘Sradicare Islamizzazione’. Antifascisti Protestano, 
Traffico Bloccato”, Bologna Today, 6 October 2019, https://www.bolognatoday.it/cronaca/forza-nuova-mos-
chea-san-domenico.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).
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Figure 2: Large banner aixed by Fratelli d’Italia in a central square in Naples (18 July 2018).
Media
e aggressive articles from the traditional right-wing press (Il Giornale, La Verità, 
Il Tempo, and Libero) against migration, Islam, and Muslim communities continued 
in 2018, in line with a communicative xenophobic strategy in order to negatively 
represent the Islamic culture as incompatible with “our customs” and characterised 
by violence and terrorism. e rhetoric is aimed at promoting a vision of Islam in 
terms of public order and/or security linked with the so-called illegal Islamic centres 
or mosques. e anti-Islam communication strategy promoted by these newspapers 
is joined with the blaming of all the political, religious, and civil players involved at 
di!erent levels in the defence of the rights of migrants and/or Islamic communities. 
Some important opinion leaders such as Marcello Veneziani, columnist for Il Tempo, 
and Giancarlo Mazzucca, columnist for Il Giornale, wrote di!erent articles against 
Pope Francesco and the most progressive Catholic magazines (e.g. Famiglia Cristi-
ana, Avvenire), which they consider guilty of opening a dialogue with Islam and of 
being the “enemies of real Christianity”.21 
During the intense electoral campaign, Il Tempo published a front page claiming 
the following: 
21. “I Nemici Della Civiltà Cristiana”, Marcello Veneziani, 27 July 2018,  http://www.marcelloveneziani.com/ar-
ticoli/i-nemici-della-civilta-cristiana/, (Access date: 3 September 2019); Giancarlo Mazzuca, “Il Papa Non Frena 
İl Dialogo Con L’islam”, il Giornale.it, 1 April 2018, http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/papa-non-frena-dialo-
go-lislam-1511169.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019). 
It is important to highlight the numerous news and/or opinions strongly contrary to Pope Francisco and all the 
different figures of progressive Catholic clergymen, bishops and representatives of the Catholic Church who openly 
defend refugees, migrants, and Muslims.
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Islam votes for the left parties. Exclusive: In the mosques and in the worship 
places Muslims are invited to vote against Salvini and Meloni. If the right wing 
wins, there will be no Ius soli and restrictions to migrants and irregular religious 
centres.
 (Il Tempo, 18 February, 2018)
Some days later Il Giornale published a similar and irritating title: 
Call of the iman: In the ballot box Allah sees you. Muslims, vote for the left 
parties.
(Il Giornale, 28 February, 2018)
!e mass media discourse builds that we call the “Islamophobic common sense” 
which normalises the xenophobic and racist attitudes in the public opinion. !e 
year 2018 has been paradigmatic of this dynamic in the media and it is only in part 
justi"ed by the electoral period. Most of the news in the right-wing newspapers re-
garding Islam or Muslims emphasise a sort of obsession in terms of “submission to 
Sharia” or the “Islamist e#ect”. For example, Il Giornale on 5 May, 2018, published 
some news about a project promoted by a hospital in Lodi (an important city close 
to Milan) regarding Muslim women and their medical treatment by female doctors 
in the following terms: “Attempts of Sharia. Islam conquers Italian hospitals”.22 !e 
word “submission” is very important, and it constantly recalls the “threating con"g-
uration” of Islam. !e “alchemy” consists in the transformation of normal situations 
of integration into risks of Islamisation of Italian society. 
However, the obsession of representing Islam as a brutal religion is well exem-
pli"ed by Libero, which, after the tragedy of the collapse of the bridge in Genoa in 
August, published an Islamophobic article along with the following title:
For the Islamics it has been Allah: !e bridge collapsed because you have not 
built the mosques.
(Libero, 17 August 2018) (Fig. 3)
!e newspaper Il Giornale, again, in 2018 published two books inspired by 
explicit anti-Islamic feelings. On 15 September, it published a book focused on 
the "gure of Oriana Fallaci entitled !e Enemies of Oriana. Fallaci, Islam and the 
Politically Correct, where the author repeatedly dwells on the rhetoric of the fa-
mous reporter against the menace of Islamisation towards Italian and European 
societies and the presumed “buonismo” (bleeding-heart liberalism) as an accessory 
to this potential threat. Later, on 8 November, the newspaper o#ered its readers 
the pamphlet !e Black Book of Italian Islam that focused on an analysis that 
22. Nico Di Giuseppe, “Lodi, L’ospedale S’inchina All’islam:  Solo Personale Donna İn Corsia”, il Giornale.it, 4 May 
2018, http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/lodi-lospedale-si-inchina-allislam-solo-personale-donna-1522465.
html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).
488
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018
setav.org
took for granted that Muslims are an “internal enemy” and Islam is a religion of 
violence against which an intervention to defend our social, cultural, and moral 
order is needed.
Previously, at the beginning of February, a journalist of Il Foglio published the 
book Il suicidio della cultura occidentale: Così l’Islam radicale sta vincendo (!e Suicide 
of Western Culture: !is Is How Radical Islam Is Winning). !e thesis of this book is 
a “typical” topic: the threat of Islamisation towards Europe, and the defeat of Christi-
anity and Western cultures because of our “multiculturalist” decay and softness. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Figure 3. Front page of the newspaper Libero, 17August 2018.23
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Figure 4: Cover of Alberto Giannoni’s book The Black Book of Italian Islam.24
23. Andrea Morigi, “Per Glı Islamıcı È Stato Allah ‘È Crollato Perché Non Avete Fatto Le Moschee”, Pressread-
er, 17 August 2018, https://www.pressreader.com/italy/libero/20180817/281668255817363, (Access date: 3 
September 2019).
24. Alberto Giannoni, The Black Book of Italian Islam. 
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Justice System25
In many cases, the role of the justice system is fundamental in applying the anti-dis-
crimination law in Italy, in sustaining the legal citizenship rights of Muslim commu-
nities, and in avoiding verbal and physical attacks. Following are two paradigmatic 
examples: in June, the court of Milan based on the Anti-Discrimination Law con-
demned the mayor of Albettone (a village close to Vicenza), a proponent member 
of League North, for racist statements against migrants, Roma people, and Muslims 
during certain television avnd/or radio interviews. On a radio program, the mayor 
had declared, “We’ll be the largest European pig breeding farm if they want to open 
a mosque”.26 In December, another important sentence was promulgated by the Re-
gional and Administrative Court of Lombardy against the Regional Law adopted by 
the Government of Lombardy in 2015 regarding the construction of mosques. For 
the court, the regional law would be an obstacle to the freedom of religion enshrined 
in the Constitution as the former laid out explicit norms restricting the latter; this 
verdict was in line with the sentence in 2016 of the Constitutional Court over the 
illegitimacy of regional standards.27 
Internet
In continuity with the 2017 report, the relationship between the Internet, social 
media, racism, and fake news has been decisive in the widespread misrecognition and 
false representations of Islam and Muslim citizens.
In 2018, the NGO Vox Diritti published the report “Map of Intolerance in It-
aly”, a mapping of hate speech on Twitter. !e analysis of 6.544.637 tweets showed 
the increase of hate tweets in 2018 (from March to May) to 36,93% compared to 
32,45% in 2017 (from May to November). According to the results, the growth 
of hate tweets against Muslims is signi"cant: Islamophobic tweets increased from 
22.435 in 2016 to 64.934 in the period 2017/2018.28 
Regarding the presence on the Internet of extreme-right movements and 
neo-fascist groups directly involved in the “Islamophobic marketing”, there is a large 
25. We want to thank lawyer Alberto Guariso, involved for many years in the defence of the rights of immigrants 
and Muslim communities, for his information on the justice system and employment.
26. “Odio Razziale: Joe Formaggio Condannato A Milano”, Vicenza Today, 07 June 2018, http://www.vicenzatoday.
it/cronaca/sindaco-albettone-joe-formaggio-condannato-tribunale-milano-razzismo-rom-migranti.html, (Access 
date: 3 September 2019). For the sentence see: “Il Sindaco Di Albettone Offende Profughi, Rom E Musulmani: 
Condannato A Risarcire Il Danno Alle Associazioni”, Associazione Per Gli Studi Giuridici Sull’ımmigrazione, 8 
June 2019, https://www.asgi.it/discriminazioni/il-sindaco-di-albettone-offende-profughi-rom-e-musulmani-con-
dannato-a-risarcire-il-danno-alle-associazioni/, (Access date: 3 September 2019).
27. “Legge Anti-Moschee, Altolà Del Tar Della Lombardia”, Il Giorno Milano, 24 August 2018, https://www.ilg-
iorno.it/milano/cronaca/legge-anti-moschea-1.4104055, (Access date: 3 September 2019); Redazione, “Legge An-
ti-Moschee, Nuovo Stop, Riforma, 9 October 2018,  https://riforma.it/it/articolo/2018/10/09/legge-anti-moschee-
nuovo-stop, (Access date: 4 September 2019).
28. Redazione Vox, “Ecco Le Mappe Di Vox Contro L’intolleranza”, Vox, http://www.voxdiritti.it/ecco-le-mappe- 
di-vox-contro-lintolleranza, (Access date: 4 September 2019).
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variety of FB pages or Internet sites as outlined in previous reports. In this frame, 
it is noteworthy to underline the importance of the neo-fascist movements Forza 
Nuova and Casa Pound in the social media and the Internet with their anti-Islam 
and anti-migration discursive strategy. In 2018 both movements’ FB pages reached 
273.697 and 250.914 followers respectively, with a widespread presence of local 
headquarter FB pages, 97 and 101 respectively. In 2018, two news sites were born on 
Facebook: “No Islam Italia” (No Islam Italy) whose page reached 10.425 likes, and 
“No Invasion, No Islam” with 18.575 likes.29 
!e electoral campaign and the formation of the new government played a 
determinant role in the increase of Islamophobic hate speech in terms of “sovere-
ignism”. Some Internet pages such as “Riscatto Nazionale” (National Liberation, 
www.riscattonazionale.org) or Identità.com (Identity) are paradigmatic of the rela-
tionship between the xenophobic news and online attacks against Islam and Muslim 
groups in defence of “Italianess”. !e increase of fake news or “bad news” about 
Islamic issues (and immigrants in general) is highlighted by the large audience of 
sites such as www.bastabugie.it linked to ultraconservative Catholic thought, or iN-
ews24 with its recall to “Italians First” whose FB’s page has reached 1.5 million likes 
in 2018. 
Recently, the famous racist and Islamophobic site of fake news voxnews.info, 
repeatedly closed down by postal police, has been connected with another successful 
site, whose name is paradigmatic: “all the crimes of immigrants” (tuttiicriminideg-
liimmigrati.com). 
Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network
!e connection between opinion leaders, bloggers, newspapers, FB pages, Internet 
sites, and leaders (or leading "gures) of far right parties or movements is the most 
signi"cant issue of the Islamophobia network in Italy. !is Islamophobic “nebulas” 
present some main recognisable players that rely on a common strategy, but not a 
speci"c think tank. It is possible to identify a synergy between the ultraconservative 
sectors of the Catholic Church, mass media (the right-wing newspapers La Verità, Il 
Giornale, and Libero), and the cultural system, with the political parties joined by the 
neo-fascist movements that promote and reiterate sovereignism and racist discourse 
(such as Lega Nord, Fratelli d’Italia, Casa Pound, and Forza Nuova). In 2018, the 
election time and the resulting government were critical factors in the increase of the 
pseudo-debate in negative terms against Muslims and Islam.
29. No Islam Italia, Facebook, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/NoIslamItalia, https://www.facebook.com/Nicola-
costanzoo/?ref=br_rs, (Access date: 4 September 2019).
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Observed Civil Society and Political Assessment 
and Political Initiatives 
In certain occasions, the main centre-left party (Democratic Party) has played an 
important role in supporting the needs of Muslim communities at a local level. For 
example, the Democratic Party in Lodi, an important city close to Milan, gave its 
headquarters for the end of Ramadan; the event was participated by one thousand 
Muslim men and women from the city and the surroundings. 
!e role of the ANPI, the national association of Italian Partisans, in "ghting 
the extreme right-wing party or neo-fascist movements in Italy by denouncing them 
to police and organizing public demonstrations in every part of Italy to sustain the 
dialogue with migrant and Muslims communities is also crucial. !e ANPI rep-
resents a fundamental “enemy” of neo-fascist movements or groups in terms of resis-
tance to racism and Islamophobia. 
In May, the organizing committee of the Islamic constituent in Italy showed its 
concern over the draft of the “Government Agreement” signed by the League North 
and Five Stars. !e text contains strong claims stigmatising religious practices of 
Islam and rea$rming typical stereotypes and prejudices that view Islam as a serious 
threat.30 In a following interview, a spokesperson from the mosque of Turin and the 
imam of the mosque of Florence declared their worries about the statements of the 
Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini aimed at criminalising the Islamic communities. 
!e Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities of Trieste signed a historical 
shared document expressing strong dissent against the demonstration of Forza Nuo-
va on the celebration day of the patron saint of the city.
From the perspective of "ghting the anti-Islamic prejudice that is widespread 
in Italian society, the project “Donne Unite contro l’Islamofobia” (Women Unit-
ed against Islamophobia) promoted by the European Network Against Racism 
(ENAR)31 is signi"cant. In this dialogical frame it is important to mention the or-
ganisation of meetings for the “Christian-Islamic Dialogue Day” on 27 October in 
Ravenna whose main theme was “No Mosque Is Illegal!”. In these signi"cant meet-
ings, organisers have wanted to rea$rm the principle of “religious freedom” enacted 
in the Italian Constitution that cannot be subordinated to urbanistic rules or to any 
popular referendum in order to approve the construction of new places of worship.32 
30.  Redazione, “Islamofobia E Xenofobia Nel Programma Di Governo. La Denuncia Della Costituente Islamica”, 
FarodiRoma, 18 May 2018, http://www.farodiroma.it/islamofobia-e-xenofobia-nel-programma-di-governo-la-de-
nuncia-della-costituente-islamica, (Access date: 4 September 2019).
31. “Donne Unite Contro L’islamofobia”, Centro Per La Cooperazione Internazionale, https://www.cci.tn.it/CCI/
Eventi/Donne-unite-contro-l-islamofobia, (Access date: 4 September 2019).
32. “27 Ottobre, Giornata Ecumenica Del Dialogo Cristiano-İslamico”, Radio Voce Della Speranza, 24 October 
2018, https://radiovocedellasperanza.it/27-ottobre-giornata-ecumenica-del-dialogo-cristiano-islamico, (Access date: 
4 September 2019).
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Another important step towards the dialogue between local public institutions 
and Islam is the “Progetto di formazione dei ministri di culto islamico” (Project of 
Training for Islamic Ministers) born from the impulse of the Prefecture of Brescia 
and realised through the collaboration between the University of Brescia and the 
Islamic Centres of Brescia and its district. At the beginning of December, more than 
50 diplomas were handed out to all those who had joined the project. Some of these 
new “ministers” will be operative inside the prison of Brescia to combat the process 
of radicalisation. 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Islamophobia in Italy is real. We can con"rm the existence of two anti-Muslim feelings 
strongly connected. We have called the "rst one “Political Islamophobia” because of the 
expressions of the main leaders of right and extreme-right parties or movements, based 
on the notion of “securitisation”, criminalisation, fear of Islam as a “terroristic religion”, 
and a strong struggle against the mosque which is seen as a threat. !e second one is 
“Cultural Islamophobia”, related to the speci"c opinions that part of the mass media 
release, by portraying Muslim people only in connection to the migration phenome-
non, and Islamic culture as not integrable and as deeply sexist.33 
!is double and interconnected con"guration of Islamophobia in politics and 
culture needs to be fought with a multiplicity of instruments and players at every 
level of civil life. 
Regarding NGOs, democratic and anti-racist movements, and left-wing par-
ties, it is necessary that they act together at local and national levels to enhance the 
struggle against the widespread racism and Islamophobia in Italy. It is a di$cult task 
in the current sociopolitical situation because consensus with the anti-migrant and 
anti-Muslim rhetoric of League North and of its leader Matteo Salvini is very strong. 
As Censis, an independent centre of social research, highlighted in its last annu-
al report, Italian society is experiencing a sort of “psychic sovereignism” de"ned by a 
closure, a retreat, and an intolerance towards diversity.34 
Another signi"cant analysis has shown with extreme clarity that Italians bear neg-
ative feelings towards Islam and Muslims. !e research promoted by the Social Change 
Initiative in partnership with More in Common on the attitudes of Italians toward im-
migration and refugees has highlighted that “the concern that people from Islamic back-
grounds may not integrate into Italian society is re+ected into the point of view held 
by 40 per cent of Italians, claiming that Italian identity and Islam are incompatible”.35 
33. This double representation is deeply present in the Islamophobic ideology; see: Padovan D. and Alietti A., “The 
Racialisation of Public Discourse”, European Societies, 14:2, 2012, pp. 186-202.
34. “About the final report”, CENSIS, http://www.censis.it/10?shadow_ricerca=121097, (Access date: 4 September 
2019).
35. Tim Dixon, Stephen Hawkins, Laurence Heijbroek, Míriam Juan-Torres and François-Xavier Demoures, “Atti-
tudes towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy”, July 2018, https://www.thesocialchangeinitiative.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Italy-EN-Execuative-Summary.compressed.pdf, (Access date: 4 September 2019). 
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According to a Eurispes report in Italy in 2018, just 28% of Italians know the 
right number of foreigners (8% of the entire population) and, above all, only 31.2% 
evaluate correctly the presence of immigrants following the Islamic religion, which 
is 3%.36 
On 29 May, the PEW Research Centre published the report “Being Christian 
in Western Europe” based on the survey carried out in 2017.37 From the main em-
pirical evidence, the Italian sample has the highest rate of people who know “not 
too much” or “nothing at all” about the Muslim religion and its practices (74%), 
and the highest rate related to negative responses regarding the “acceptance of a 
Muslim as member of the family” (43% of the sample compared with the average 
of the entire sample which stood at 24%) and “a Muslim as a neighbour” (21% 
compared with the average of 11%). Fifty-three per cent of the Italian interviewees 
declared that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with the “country’s culture and 
values” putting Italy at the second place in the whole European sample behind 
only Finland. Another signi"cant source is the report “Second European Union 
Minorities and Discrimination Survey Being Black in the EU” promoted by the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Among the most relevant 
“grounds for discrimination experienced in four areas of daily life in the 5 years 
before”, the Italian sample of black minorities declared to be discriminated on re-
ligious grounds in 10% of the cases, ending up at the third place behind Denmark 
and Sweden.38
Another important observation regards Islamic organisations, which are frag-
mented and weakly represented. Consequently, there are di@erent obstacles to "nd a 
unitary “voice” against the negative public discourse that a@ects Muslim collectives.39 
Moreover, under the League North-Five Stars government the path of institu-
tional dialogue between the state and Islamic organizations signed by the previous 
government in December 2017 has been interrupted. Now, it is impossible to know 
when it will be possible to continue this necessary o$cial dialogue.
In this frame of hostility and di$culty to react, the work of progressive forces 
should focus on building an anti-discrimination network on the di@erent levels of 
everyday life and on the constant condemnation of discriminatory events/acts/laws 
which a@ect the rights of citizenship of migrants and Muslims. In this perspective, it 
36. “About Rapporto Italia”, EURISPES, 2018, http://www.eurispes.eu/sites/default/files/Eurispes_Sintesi_Rappor-
to_Italia_2018.pdf, (Access date: 4 September 2019).
37. The survey has been realized on 15 European countries, including Italy. For all methodological information and 
the complete analysis, see: “Nationalism, İmmigration And Minorities”, Pew Research Center, 29 May 2018, http://
www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/nationalism-immigration-and-minorities/, (Access date: 4 September 2019).
38. “Being Black in the EU”, Fra European Unıon Agency For Fundamental Rıghts, November 2018, https://fra.
europa.eu/en/publication/2018/eumidis-ii-being-black, (Access date: 4 September 2019).
39. We thank Reas Syed for his information about the dialogue between public institutions and Islamic associations 
and for his analysis of the fragmentation of Islamic representation at the local level. 
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is important to recall the signi"cant role of the judiciary system in the application of 
the anti-discrimination law and in the defence of religious rights. 
In terms of policy, we suggest:
1. !e creation of a permanent worktable for interreligious dialogue; some sig-
ni"cant examples of dialogue between Islamic and Catholic organisations at 
a local level represent a solid starting point.
2. Supporting the main Islamic organisations to "nd common grounds to 
claim their rights and to contrast the xenophobic and Islamophobic public 
discourses more e@ectively.
3. Creating a systematic and e$cient system of data collection on Islamopho-
bic, racist, and discriminatory events; some NGOs, as mentioned above, are 
important in this perspective but they must be supported in their job with 
the possibility to integrate all the main sources of data. 
4. Strengthening the anti-discrimination network between NGOs, associa-
tions, trade unions, and left-wing parties, especially at a local level where it 
is possible to act more e@ectively to promote equality and justice.
5. Strengthening the fundamental political role of UNAR (National O$ce for 
Racial Anti-discrimination) in order to implement national policies against 
religious discrimination, above all in the contexts that are more close to 
inclusiveness of diversity; in this perspective it is important to sustain the 
work directed to create anti-racist networks inside civil society.
6. Implementing an educational policy in the school system that supports “re-
ligious literacy” to prevent con+icts and to deepen knowledge about Islam.
Chronology 
• 12.01.2018 Sesto Fiorentino (Florence): Militants of the Brothers of Italy 
a$xed a big billboard close to the lot of land designated for the construc-
tion of a mosque that stated, “No to Mosque” and “Italians First”. 
• 17.01.2018 Bologna: A judge denied access to the court to a young lawyer 
because she was wearing the Islamic veil.
• 29.01.2018 Rome: Matteo Salvini declared that nowadays Islam is a danger 
and his future government would put a stop to the irregular Islamic pres-
ence in Italy. 
• 03.02.2018 Macerata: Luca Traini, a supporter of far right movements 
such as Forza Nuova, shot a group of Nigerian immigrants; six immigrants 
("ve men and one woman) were wounded.
• 08.02.2018 Milano: Matteo Salvini declared being against a project for the 
construction of an Islamic centre, claiming that “Islam is incompatible with 
the Italian Constitution”.
